Російське посольство до Ірану 1817 року: очікування і результати

Abstract

Дано оцінку спробам налагодити російсько-перські відносини і втілити в життя умови Гюлістанської мирної угоди. Охарактеризовано діяльність О. П. Єрмолова на посаді повноважного міністра в Ірані.

Дана оценка попыткам наладить русско-иранские отношения и воплотить в жизнь условия Гюлистанского мирного договора. Охарактеризована деятельность А. П. Ермолова на должности полномочного министра в Иране.

After Gulistan peace treaty concluded in 1813 by Russia and Iran certain tension existed between two powers. It was evident that Iranians were preparing a revanche to return lost lands of Shirvan. Persian ambassador Abul Hasan Khan spent about two years in St. Petersburg negotiating postwar regulating in Caucasus region. In his turn Alexander I appointed General A.P. Yermolov a Minister Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Iran and a viceroy of Georgia. Yermolov had to determine acceptable concessions and to act in accordance with his own decisions. He was also authorized to negotiate opening Russian missions and consulates in the north of Iran and to confirm recognition of Abbas Mirza as an heir of Iranian throne. Despite being awaited to bring Russian-Iranian relations back to normal Yermolov created new problems. For instance he refused to follow Asian etiquette and openly ignored Abbas Mirza. During negotiations in Soltaniyeh Yermolov threatened shah’s representatives to invade into Azerbaijan and to achieve his goals by force. For their part Iranian officials ignored Yermolov’s prepositions to conclude a military alliance against Ottoman Empire and to establish constant missions in Tiflis and Tabriz. After a month spent in Soltaniyeh Russian embassy turned back to Tabriz and then to Tiflis. In his reports to Alexander I Yermolov claimed to have performed his task successfully. In a short time he was rewarded for his diplomatic activities though in fact he failed to strengthen Russian-Iranian relations. Such a reaction to Yermolov’s activities made it evident that the cabinet in St. Petersburg found it more beneficial to pursue a policy of threats and démarches than to perform a really peace-making diplomacy. Such acts were leading two powers to a new conflict which eventually began in 1826.